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Rachel M. Scott, The Challenge of Political Islam: Non-Muslims and the Egyptian 
State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010).  Pp. 277.  $65 cloth, $24.95 paper. 
If Islamists took power in Egypt, then what kind of state would they make, and 
what role could non-Muslims play in it?  This question stands at the heart of Rachel M. 
Scott’s compelling book, which draws upon an array of published Arabic sources and 
interviews.  “The question of the role of non-Muslims in an Islamic state,” argues Scott, 
“runs parallel to many issues that emerge in discussions about Islamist thought in general, 
such as the Islamist positions on democracy, pluralism, and citizenship.  It is for this 
reason that the question of the role and status of the [Christian] Copts is so important” 
(pp. 90-91). 
Scott implicitly acknowledges another tricky question: how “secular” has Egypt 
ever been?  During the twentieth century, the Egyptian state asserted its Islamic character 
in various ways.  The 1923 Constitution declared Islam the official religion of state.  In 
1971, Sadat ratified a new constitution that declared Shari’a law “a” main source of 
legislation.  In 1980 the constitution changed the indefinite article to a definite one, 
pronouncing Shari’a “the” main source of legislation – a step that Scott describes as 
move towards “Islamization” (p. 58).  At the time, many Copts appear to have viewed 
these constitutional recognitions of Shar’ia with dismay.  Yet it is no longer true – if it 
ever was – that Copts endorse the creation of a (more) secular state. 
Certainly Coptic secularists – like Muslim secularists – are rare creatures today.  
At a time when the Coptic Orthodox Church exerts a powerful influence over its 
members and provides them with welfare services, few Copts are calling for a purely 
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secular, pan-Egyptian civil law.  Instead, argues Scott, “the majority of Copts”, like the 
majority of Muslims, appear to “envisage a kind of [Egyptian] citizenship that preserves 
religious identity and religious community” by law (p. 169). 
As for members of the Muslim Brotherhood, a glance at their writings might 
suggest that they are evasive, even cagey, about the place of non-Muslims in an Islamist 
state.  Some accuse the Muslim Brotherhood of practicing a Shi’a-like taqiyya or 
dissimulation, hiding their true ideas for the sake of self-preservation.  But as Scott 
argues, “rather than interpreting ideological inconsistencies as duplicity on the part of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, one should view the group as a complex organization with 
competing and conflicting visions” (p. 53).  That is, among Islamists there are liberals, 
conservatives, and radicals, as well as some who have changed their views over time.   
Because Islamists tend to value early Islamic historical precedents so highly, 
many have hailed the the dhimma – the “pact” that historically applied to Christians and 
Jews in Islamic domains – as a model for regulating Coptic-Muslim relations in a future 
Egyptian Islamist state.  Therefore Scott pays close attention to Islamist discussions of 
this subject.  Yet while “dhimma” may evoke positive feelings among Muslims (who 
associate the term with an ideal of Islamic state tolerance toward “people of book”), 
Copts in Egypt seem widely to fear the formal revival of the dhimma system, recalling its 
assumptions of non-Muslim subordination and potential for humiliation.  (They appear 
less concerned, by contrast, with the idea of the millet system of religious communities, 
as it existed in the late Ottoman period.)  In some detail, Scott explains how various 
Egyptian Islamists have tried to reconcile ideals of Shari’a law and the dhimma with 
notions of citizenship in the modern nation-state.  Many questions arise from their 
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discussions.  Should Copts, as dhimmis, be able to serve in an Egyptian army that 
requires defense of Islamic statehood?  (Many Islamists have said no to Coptic army 
service, and yes to the idea of reviving the jizya tax on Christians in lieu of military 
service.) Would a Christian’s testimony count as much as a Muslim’s in court, or would 
the life of a Christian (e.g., in a homicide case involving a Muslim) be valued as highly?  
(Islamists have not broached this question.)  Can Christians serve as judges or even, in 
theory, as presidents?  (Most say no.)   
Ultimately, argued Ma’mun al-Hudaybi, leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, his 
own organization would accept Coptic involvement in the political system “as long as 
these Copts do what they are required to do” (p. 111).  Meanwhile, the most radical 
Islamists deny that Christians should enjoy the protection enshrined in a dhimma system 
at all, and reject the idea that Muslims and Christians can be friends.  But as Scott points 
out, such hardliners “are largely going against the Islamic historical experience, which is 
one that was defined by Christians and Muslims living together” (p. 191). 
Scott highlights one group of Islamists who split off from the Muslim 
Brotherhood in 1996 to form a party called “al-Wasat” (meaning “the middle”, implying 
centrism), and praises their contributions to theories of Islamist citizenship.  “For the 
Wasatiyya Islamists,” she writes, “non-Muslims have evolved to be part of the umma, 
which is the historical product of the cooperative efforts of all religious groups that have 
lived and worked together” (p. 135).  Like other Islamists, Wasatiyya intellectuals stress 
Islamic law as the critical basis for Egyptian governance.  What distinguishes them from 
other Islamists is their more inclusive understanding of Egyptianness and their congenial 
attitude towards Christians as co-nationals. 
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Why is this Wasatiyya-style vision of Egyptian Muslim-Christian fellowship not 
more prevalent among Islamists?  Perhaps because debates on Islamist citizenship have 
occurred at a time when Muslims and Christians (outside of elite circles) have become 
increasingly isolated from each other.  Scott quotes the Coptic intellectual Munir Fakhri 
Abd al-Nur, who embraces a vision of national unity.  He lamented that “Muslims and 
Christians are not mixing together anymore….  I can see that; I can feel that.  I go and sit 
in the cafes in the small streets of the very, very popular quarter.  There are no Copts.  I 
go to the churches, you find all the Copts there where they do everything” (p. 71).  
In refreshingly clear, jargon-free language, Scott examines the spectrum of Coptic 
and Islamist thought as it relates to the theoretical place of non-Muslims as dhimmis or 
citizens in an Egyptian Islamized state.  By the end, the question posed at the outset – “If 
Islamists were to assume power in Egypt, then what kind of Islamic state would they 
make?” – still lingers.  But this, at least, seems evident: Pope Shenouda III and certain 
Coptic Orthodox Church leaders, who are anxious to preserve power in the church, share 
the Islamist desire to see the state and the law enshrine religious communalism.  Thus 
church leaders may be willing to make a pact with Islamists in return for autonomy.  In 
short, some Coptic leaders may welcome a neo-millet arrangement that lacks the official 
subordination of the dhimma system but that tacitly accepts the definition of Christians as 
junior citizens. 
In Scott’s story, the most vulnerable non-Muslims in Egypt are the Baha’is, a tiny 
community with some 2,000 members.  As followers of a post-Islamic religion, Baha’is 
have not enjoyed recognition as “people of the book” and have labored under a variety of 
civil disabilities in Egypt.  Among moderate Islamists, not even Wasatiyya thinkers 
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(including the pro-Islamist Evangelical Christian, Rafiq Habib) have been prepared to 
endorse broad civil rights (such as the right to build places of worship) for Egypt’s 
Baha’is.  This last point suggests that, if an Islamist state were to take hold, religious 
liberty in Egypt would run against some hard limits. 
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